During the first half of the twentieth century, many philosophers of memory opposed the postulation of memory traces based on the claim that a satisfactory account of remembering need not include references to causal processes involved in recollection. However, in 1966, an influential paper by Martin and Deutscher showed that causal claims are indeed necessary for a proper account of remembering. This, however, did not settle the issue, as in 1977 Malcolm argued that even if one were to buy (...) Martin and Deutscher’s argument for causal claims, we still don’t need to postulate the existence of memory traces. This paper reconstructs the dialectic between realists and anti-realists about memory traces, suggesting that ultimately realists’ arguments amount to inferences to the best explanation. I then argue that Malcolm’s anti-realist strategy consists in the suggestion that causal explanations that do not invoke memory traces are at least as good as those that do. But then, Malcolm, I argue that there are a large number of memory phenomena for which explanations that do not postulate the existence of memory traces are definitively worse than explanations that do postulate them. Next, I offer a causal model based on an interventionist framework to illustrate when memory traces can help to explain memory phenomena and proceed to substantiate the model with details coming from extant findings in the neuroscience of memory. (shrink)

Intentaremos reconstruir la controversia acerca de la posibilidad de un lenguaje privado. Analizamos primero las posiciones “epistemológicas” (Malcolm y Fogelin), mostrando sus fallos. Luego analizamos la versión “semántica” (Kenny y Tugendhat) encontrándolas igualmente fallidas. La crítica de Barry Stroud a los argumentos trascendentales como argumentos antiescépticos nos permite discernir el presupuesto común que debilita las posiciones anteriores. Asimismo, la reconstrucción permite apreciar mejor la manera en la que la versión de Kripke evita comprometerse con este presupueto. Argumentamos que esta (...) versión es la única versión consistente del argumento. Esta afirmación obliga afrontar algunas de las objeciones corrientes dirigidas a la propuesta de Kripke: el problema de la objetividad de la regla, ¿puede un individuo estar acertado en contra de la opinión comunitaria consensuada?; y el problema de las relaciones internas entre reglas y casos, presuntamente violentada por el rol que la noción de acuerdo comunitario desempeña en la misma. Sostenemos que nuestra reconstrucción de la controversia permite encontrar razones para mostrar por qué las objeciones mencionadas no se le aplican. -/- This paper tries to reconstruct the controversy on the possibility of private language. First, we analyse “epistemological” trends in the argument (Malcolm, Fogelin) showing their failures. Then, we analyse “semantic” versions (Kenny, Tugendhat) finding they are also failed. Barry Stroud’s criticism of transcendental arguments as refutations of scepticism allows us to discern the common presupposition that weakens the versions of the argument considered. Moreover, this reconstruction allows us to see how Kripke’s deals with the problem of the previous discussion in order to avoid committing himself with this presupposition. We consider Kripke’s version to be the only consistent version of the argument. Such a statement obliges us to consider two of the most important criticisms directed against Kripke’s Wittgenstein: The problem of objectivity of the rule: Can a single individual be right in contradicting communal assent?; and the problem of internal relationships between rules and their applications, allegedly violated because of the role played by communal agreement. We claim that our reconstruction of the controversy provides good reasons to show that the above-mentioned objections don’t apply to Kripke’s Wittgenstein version. (shrink)

La tesis de la privacidad linguitica nace con el gesto fundador de la filosofía moderna que apoya toda legitimidad en la subjetividad y la conciencia. Ello da origen a dos problemas filos�ficos fundamentales, concernientes al mundo y al solipsismo. El siglo XX creyó encontrar en el lenguaje una salida a estos problemas. Wittgenstein es allí una pieza clave. Sin embargo las interpretaciones más influyentes de Wittgenstein enfocaron la crítica del lenguaje privado de tal modo que la salida debía permanecer en (...) el terreno epistemológico de las garantías o criterio de corrección (Malcolm, Fogelin, Kenny, Canfield, Tugendhat). Sostenemos que la interpretación propuesta por Kripke se apoya un un agudo diagnóstico de la fuente de estas dificultades, dándose cuenta que la refutación del lenguaje privado requería abandonar toda una concepción, la del realismo, que afectaban por igual al lenguaje privado y al público. Su argumentación, centrada en la semántica, irradia consecuencias más allá de la misma. Su "solución escéptica" al establecer que los juicios de corrección, entendidos como básicos y primitivos, sólo poseen sentido en el marco de una comunidad uniforme en sus juicios, coloca al discurso filosófico en un nuevo terreno. (shrink)

In De Anima III.3 Aristotle presents his official discussion of phantasia (“imagination” in most translations). At the very outset of the discussion Aristotle offers as an endoxon that “phantasia is that in virtue of which we say that a phantasma occurs to us” (428a1-2). Now a natural reading of this claim, taken up by many commentators, can pose a problem for Aristotle’s overall account of perception. Here I argue that, although it would be silly to deny that Aristotle considers phantasia (...) to be that in virtue of which a phantasma occurs to someone, it is not silly to deny that phantasmata are present in every case in which phantasia is operative. This suggestion bolsters the idea that, according to Aristotle’s account of veridical perception, we can understand the world as making itself perceptually manifest to the perceiver. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Comments on “Moral Complicity in Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell Research”W. Malcolm Byrnes, Ph.D. and Edward J. FurtonIn his article titled “Moral Complicity in Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell Research,” Mark T. Brown (2009) unfortunately mischaracterizes my ethical analysis of the use of induced pluripotent stem (iPS) cells for replacement therapies, or treatments (Byrnes 2008). In my paper, which Brown cites, I argue that, just as it is ethically acceptable (...) for parents to allow their children and themselves to be immunized using vaccines produced by cell lines derived from human fetuses aborted in the past, it is also acceptable for persons in the future to benefit from treatments that use iPS cells validated using human embryonic stem (ES) cell lines [End Page 202] derived in the past. The assumption I make is that iPS cells would have to be shown to be functionally equivalent to human ES cells—i.e., validated—before they could be used for cell replacement treatments. (If it turns out that this assumption is incorrect, and primate or even mouse ES cells can be used for the validation, then all residual ethical problems will disappear and there will be no ethical problems whatsoever associated with iPS cells.) I wrote:... [I]n both cases, the origin of the treatment is in a one-time event: either the one-time use of aborted fetuses to obtain cell lines (e.g., MRC-5 and WI- 38) to grow weakened virus strains for vaccine production, or the one-time destruction of human embryos to validate iPS cells, which then effectively replace embryonic stem cells. In the latter case, if no additional embryonic stem cell lines are derived, then derivation of the existing lines could be considered a “one-time” event in the past, albeit an event that extended over a several-year period(Byrnes 2008, p. 287, emphasis added).Note the phrase “if no additional embryonic stem cell lines are derived.” The derivation of ES cell lines inherently involves destruction of embryos; indeed, that is why many people, including me, are opposed to human ES cell research. In my article, I am arguing that, if no additional ES cell lines are derived, then no additional human embryos will be destroyed, and the destruction of human embryos will lie in the past. In this case, embryo destruction could be considered a past event, just as the abortion of a human fetus from which vaccine-producing cell lines were derived is a past, albeit tragic, event.In the process of building his argument that proponents of iPS cell research are morally complicit in embryo destruction, Brown (2009, p. 15) casts me as being in favor of the “derivation of new embryonic stem [cell lines].” This is the exact opposite of my position. In fact, I am opposed to further destruction of human embryos. I believe that the hundreds of ES cell lines already in existence are more than sufficient to validate iPS cells and so no additional lines need to be derived. This means that no additional human embryos will need to be destroyed.Apparently based on the misperception that I support future destruction of human embryos, Brown concludes that “Byrnes’s endorsement of ongoing iPSC validation studies would seem to implicate him and those who follow his lead in formal and material complicity in what they perceive as moral evil” (p. 16). He writes that “explicit formal complicity would attach because he [Byrnes] knowingly and intentionally recommends that embryos be killed in order to facilitate a transition to a future in which no more embryos need be destroyed” (p. 16). Additionally, my “followers” and I would be guilty of “proximate material complicity” as well as “remote material complicity” (p. 16). Unfortunately, this broad condemnation is based on a misconception of my actual position.An additional problem involves Brown’s use of a quotation he attributes to me: [End Page 203]Once embryonic stem cells are used to successfully validate iPS cells, they will no longer be needed and their association with iPS cells will lie in the past. Is there not an element of sadness and resignation in accepting something (iPS cells) associated with an unjust act (destruction of an... (shrink)

According to non-doxastic theories of propositional faith, belief that p is not necessary for faith that p. Rather, propositional faith merely requires a ‘positive cognitive attitude’. This broad condition, however, can be satisfied by several pragmatic approaches to a domain, including fictionalism. This paper shows precisely how fictionalists can have faith given non-doxastic theory, and explains why this is problematic. It then explores one means of separating the two theories, in virtue of the fact that the truth of the propositions (...) in a discourse is of little consequence for fictionalists, whereas their truth matters deeply for the faithful. Although promising, this approach incurs several theoretical costs, hence providing a compelling reason to favour a purely doxastic account of faith. (shrink)

According to the seventh-century C.E. philosopher Kumārila Bhat.t.a, epistemic agents are warranted in taking their world-presenting experiences as veridical, if they lack defeaters. For him, these experiences are defeasibly sources of knowledge without the agent reflecting on their content or investigating their causal origins. This position is known as svatah prāmāṇya in Sanskrit (henceforth the SP principle). -/- As explicated by the eleventh-century commentator, Pārthasārathi Misŕa, this position entails that epistemic agents know things without simultaneously knowing that they know them, (...) or being in a position to know that they know. In contrast, some contemporary Anglo-analytic philosophers argue for the “knows-knows principle” (KK principle), in which if someone knows that p, then that person also knows that they know that p, or that person is in a position to know that they know p. Despite some apparent similarities, the SP principle is not a version of the KK principle, nor would Pārthasārathi’s Kumārila have held the KK principle. -/- Recently, Daniel Immerman (2018) has argued that the SP principle is a position-to-know version of the “knows-knows principle” (KK-pos principle). By examining Kumārila’s response to his Buddhist opponent, who challenges the veracity of Vedic testimony, we will see that Kumārila understands higher-order knowing as involving an independent check on one’s epistemic processes, through an epistemic instrument known as postulation (arthāpatti). This precludes him from holding the KK-pos principle. (shrink)

Are extreme beliefs constitutive of echo chambers, or only typically caused by them? Or are many echo chambers unproblematic, amplifying relatively benign beliefs? This paper details the conceptual relations between echo chambers and extreme beliefs, showing how different conceptual choice-points in how we understand both echo chambers and extreme beliefs affects how we should evaluate, study, and engage with echo chambering groups. We also explore how our theories of extreme beliefs and echo chambers shape social scientific research and contribute in (...) a practical way when treating these phenomena, focusing on examples of climate change scepticism. (shrink)

Epistocratic systems of government have received renewed attention, and considerable opposition, in recent political philosophy. Although they vary significantly in form, epistocracies generally reject universal suffrage. But can they maintain the advantages of universal suffrage despite rejecting it? This paper develops an argument for a significant instrumental advantage of universal suffrage: that governments must take into account the interests of all of those enfranchised in their policy decisions or else risk losing power. This is called ‘the Interests Argument’. One problem (...) for the Interests Argument is that governments are not entirely responsive to voter interests, partly because voters do not always know what is in their interests. I will show how this epistemic claim can be used to support certain forms of epistocracy, but deny that it undermines the Interests Argument. I then consider whether we can identify forms of epistocracy that preserve the benefits of the Interests Argument whilst overcoming the epistemic limitations of democracy. I propose six forms of epistocracy, and argue that two are able to maintain these benefits, hence providing an evaluation of the relative strengths of these epistocracies with respect to one of the most valuable instrumental benefits of universal suffrage. Whilst epistocracy lacks many of the advantages of democracy, this paper shows that some forms fare better than others. (shrink)

There has been a recent surge of research interest in videogames of moral engagement for entertainment, advocacy and education. We have seen a wealth of analysis and several theoretical models proposed, but experimental evaluation has been scarce. One of the difficulties lies in the measurement of moral engagement. How do we meaningfully measure whether players are engaging with and affected by the moral choices in the games they play? In this paper, we survey the various standard psychometric instruments from the (...) moral psychology literature and discuss how they might be applied in the evaluation of games. (shrink)

Historically the focus of moral decision-making in games has been narrow, mostly confined to challenges of moral judgement (deciding right and wrong). In this paper, we look to moral psychology to get a broader view of the skills involved in ethical behaviour and how these skills can be employed in games. Following the Four Component Model of Rest and colleagues, we identify four “lenses” – perspectives for considering moral gameplay in terms of focus, sensitivity, judgement and action – and describe (...) the design problems raised by each. To conclude, we analyse two recent games, The Walking Dead and Papers, Please, and show how the lenses give us insight into important design differences between these games. (shrink)

Religious fundamentalism remains a significant force in global politics and religion. Despite a range of problems arising from fundamentalism, the beliefs fundamentalists hold can seem quite reasonable. This paper considers whether, in fact, fundamentalist beliefs are rational by drawing on recent ideas in contemporary epistemology. The paper presents a general theory of fundamentalist beliefs in terms of their propositional content and the high credence levels attributed to them. It then explores the way these beliefs are both acquired and retained by (...) applying ideas from the social epistemology of echo chambers and group belief. The paper then considers three accounts of the rationality of belief: evidentialist, reliabilist, and virtue-theoretic. It is argued that fundamentalist beliefs can be reasonable on evidentialist standards, but are nevertheless still problematic on reliabilist and virtue standards, since they are formed in environments that are not truth-conducive and which cultivate intellectual vice. (shrink)

Historically the focus of moral decision-making in games has been narrow, mostly confined to challenges of moral judgement (deciding right and wrong). In this paper, we look to moral psychology to get a broader view of the skills involved in ethical behaviour and how they may be employed in games. Following the Four Component Model of Rest and colleagues, we identify four “lenses” – perspectives for considering moral gameplay in terms of focus, sensitivity, judgement and action – and describe the (...) design problems raised by each. To conclude, we analyse two recent games, The Walking Dead and Papers, Please, and show how the lenses give us insight into important design differences between them. (shrink)

What is the relationship between faith and evidence? It is often claimed that faith requires going beyond evidence. In this paper, I reject this claim by showing how the moral demands to have faith warrant a person in maintaining faith in the face of counter-evidence, and by showing how the moral demands to have faith, and the moral constraints of evidentialism, are in clear tension with going beyond evidence. In arguing for these views, I develop a taxonomy of different ways (...) of irrationally going beyond evidence and contrast this with rational ways of going against evidence. I then defend instances of having a moral demand to have faith, explore how this stands in tension with going beyond and against evidence, and develop an argument for the claim that faith involves a disposition to go against, but not beyond evidence. (shrink)

Criminal law theory made a significant advance roughly thirty years ago when George Fletcher popularized the important conceptual distinction between justifications and excuses. In the intervening years, however, very little progress has been made in exploring the structure and function of justification defenses. The reason for this failure, I suggest, is a widely shared misconception about their place within the criminal law’s institutional structure. Contrary to what is generally believed, it is not up to trial courts to decide ex post (...) facto what conduct is justified and what is not. This determination is made ex ante by other institutional actors such as private fiduciaries, public officials, and sometimes, ordinary citizens caught in extraordinary circumstances. The court’s role is simply to review the validity of that prior exercise of decision-making discretion. More broadly, my study is intended to serve as a reminder of the importance of institutional structure in criminal law. It is almost always misleading to address issues in criminal law by way of abstract moral theorizing, as is often done, because this leaves out the crucial question of institutional division of labor. Before addressing the substantive aspect of particular questions—what conduct should be prohibited, justified, or excused—we must first address ourselves to the institutional questions that I have called the problems of authority, discretion, and legality. These institutional questions receive their most thorough treatment in two other areas of law: the private law of fiduciaries and public administrative law. If we wish to make progress in understanding justification defenses—and the institutional structure of criminal law more generally—I argue that it is to these areas of law that we should attend. (shrink)

Do we insult, offend or slight a speaker when we refuse her testimony? Do we compliment, commend or extol a speaker when we accept her testimony? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is “yes”, but only in some instances, since these respective insults and compliments track the reasons a hearer has for rejecting or accepting testimony. When disbelieving a speaker, a hearer may insult her because she judges the speaker to be either incompetent as a knower (...) or insincere as a teller. However, there are many instances where we reject testimony without making this negative evaluation of the speaker, and as such, without paying her an insult. Testimonial compliments are fewer in number, and are not constitutive of “everyday” testimonial exchanges, since, speakers who are competent as knowers and sincere as tellers are merely behaving correctly in accordance with the norms of testifying. Nevertheless, deferring to an authority on belief can be complimentary to that speaker if by doing so we judge her to have some mastery in a particular domain. Testimonial insults and compliments have important moral implications, particularly with regard to epistemic injustice and therapeutic trust. (shrink)

It is sometimes claimed that faith is a virtue. To what extent faith is a virtue depends on what faith is. One construal of faith, which has been popular in both recent and historical work on faith, is that faith is a matter of taking oneself to have been spoken to by God and of trusting this purported divine testimony. In this paper, I argue that when faith is understood in this way, for faith to be virtuous then it must (...) be accompanied by intellectual humility. I defend this view by showing how someone ought to respond to purported divine testimony if her faith is to be intellectually humble, and how, if it fails in this respect, it will instead be accompanied by the vices of either servility or arrogance. (shrink)

This special issue of Games and Culture focuses on the intersection between video games and ethics. This introduction briefly sets out the key research questions in the research field and identifies trends in the articles included in this special issue.

This article raises a principled objection to the privatization of certain core police services. Whereas most of the literature critical of privatizing security services has focused on the negative consequences of doing so (corruption, waste, etc.), the argument here focuses squarely on the standing of private parties to perform police services. According to an important strain of liberal political theory, certain tasks are assigned to the state not because it is deemed to be more efficient at delivering those services but (...) simply because such services must be rendered by a party that acts in the name of the polity as a whole and not in the name of some narrower private interest. The author argues that all those policing functions – such as arrest, search, and detention – that require criminal law justification (because they involve conduct on the part of officers that is generally criminally prohibited) are of this nature. The article also summarizes the different dimensions of the larger privatization debate and traces the development of the debate about legitimate policing in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (shrink)

Analytic philosophers have, since the pioneering work of B.K. Matilal, emphasized the contributions of Nyāya philosophers to what contemporary philosophy considers epistemology. More recently, scholarly work demonstrates the relevance of their ideas to argumentation theory, an interdisciplinary area of study drawing on epistemology as well as logic, rhetoric, and linguistics. This paper shows how early Nyāya theorizing about argumentation, from Vātsyāyana to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, can fruitfully be juxtaposed with the pragma-dialectic approach to argumentation pioneered by Frans van Eemeren. I illustrate (...) the implications of this analysis with a case study from Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s satirical play, Much Ado about Religion (Āgamaḍambara). (shrink)

In Indian philosophy, a pramāṇa is an epistemic instrument or doxastic practice that results in a veridical cognition (in an event of knowing). For just about all Indian thinkers, perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna) are the foundational pramāṇas, although they debated energetically over how to characterize the content of the resultant cognitions and how to explain the basis for the authority of these pramāṇas. Debate also includes the relationship of knowledge to religious liberation, the role of scripture in knowing, and (...) the possibility of omniscience. (shrink)

As robots and Artificial Intelligences become more enmeshed in rich social contexts, it seems inevitable that we will have to make them into moral machines equipped with moral skills. Apart from the technical difficulties of how we could achieve this goal, we can also ask the ethical question of whether we should seek to create such Artificial Moral Agents (AMAs). Recently, several papers have argued that we have strong reasons not to develop AMAs. In response, we develop a comprehensive analysis (...) of the relevant arguments for and against creating AMAs, and we argue that all things considered we have strong reasons to continue to responsibly develop AMAs. The key contributions of this paper are threefold. First, to provide the first comprehensive response to the important arguments made against AMAs by Wynsberghe and Robbins (in “Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents”, Science and Engineering Ethics 25, 2019) and to introduce several novel lines of argument in the process. Second, to collate and thematise for the first time the key arguments for and against AMAs in a single paper. Third, to recast the debate away from blanket arguments for or against AMAs in general, to a more nuanced discussion about the use of what sort of AMAs, in what sort of contexts, and for what sort of purposes is morally appropriate. (shrink)

Este estudio se ocupa del control social del cuerpo y de la reconfiguración de la memoria popular en películas de horror a través de la perspectiva genealógica de Foucault, presentada en su libro Vigilar y Castigar, publicado hace 40 años. Por lo tanto, tomaremos, À l’interieur e Frontière (s), dos producciones de horror cinematográfico hechas por directores franceses, ambos publicados en 2007. La hipótesis principal es que las películas de terror se muestran como una nueva forma de vigilancia y control (...) social del cuerpo. Por otro lado, también puede recodificar la memoria popular apropiándose de acontecimientos polítcos y/o revolucionarios como en las películas comentadas por Foucault en la revista Cahiers de Cinéma en 1974 políticas, aunque no sean las películas de terror. (shrink)

When you don’t believe a speaker’s testimony for reasons that call into question the speaker’s credibility, it seems that this is an insult against the speaker. There also appears to be moral reasons that count in favour of refraining from insulting someone. When taken together, these two plausible claims entail that we have a moral reason to refrain from insulting speakers with our lack of belief, and hence, sometimes, a moral reason to believe the testimony of speakers. Reasons for belief (...) arising from non-epistemic sources are controversial, and it’s often argued that it’s impossible to base a belief on non-epistemic reasons. However, I will show that even if it is possible to base a belief on non-epistemic reasons, in the case of testimonial insult, for many or most cases, the moral reasons for belief don’t need to be the basis of our doxastic response. This is because there are, in many or most cases, either sufficient epistemic reasons for belief, or sufficient moral reasons for action that guide our response to testimony. Reasons from testimonial insult, in many cases, simply lead to overdetermination. Even if there are such moral reasons for belief, they are therefore practically unnecessary in many cases. There are, though, some cases in which they play an important role in guiding belief. This perhaps surprising conclusion is one unexplored way to defend epistemic over pragmatic reasons for belief. (shrink)

This paper undertakes textual exegesis and rational reconstruction of Mukula Bhaṭṭa’s Abhidhā-vṛttta-mātṛkā, or “The Fundamentals of the Communicative Function.” The treatise was written to refute Ānandavardhana’s claim, made in the Dhvanyāloka, that there is a third “power” of words, vyañjanā (suggestion), beyond the two already accepted by traditional Indian philosophy: abhidhā (denotation) and lakṣaṇā(indication).1 I argue that the explanation of lakṣaṇā as presented in his text contains internal tensions, although it may still be a compelling response to Ānandavardhana.

Singularities in general relativity and quantum field theory are often taken not only to motivate the search for a more-fundamental theory (quantum gravity, QG), but also to characterise this new theory and shape expectations of what it is to achieve. Here, we first evaluate how particular types of singularities may suggest an incompleteness of current theories. We then classify four different 'attitudes' towards singularities in the search for QG, and show, through examples in the physics literature, that these lead to (...) different scenarios for the new theory. Two of the attitudes prompt singularity resolution, but only one suggests the need for a theory of QG. Rather than evaluate the different attitudes, we close with some suggestions of factors that influence the choice between them. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that policing can be defended as consistent with the equality of all before the law – but not by denying that policing occupies a special place in our legal order that is dangerously close to certain ancien régime privileges. In order to defend the special privileges of policing, it is essential to show that they are something quite different from the ancien régime privileges that they in some respects resemble. The crucial conceptual tool for making (...) that argument is the idea of public office. Policing, I argue, is a public office and like other public offices, it comes equipped with a number of special rights, privileges, powers, and immunities that are not generally possessed by all persons in their private capacity. But that situation is no challenge to the equality of all persons before the law. Those special rights do not belong to the office-holder as their private property, to do with them just as they would like. They belong, instead, to the office itself, and they may be exercised only by someone duly appointed to the office (who may also be duly removed from office) and only in pursuit of the purposes that define her office. The idea of public office is what makes possible a necessary and acceptable kind of inequality – that between individual private persons on the one hand and the collective person of the state on the other – while maintaining the kind of equality that matters, which is the equality of all persons vis-à-vis one another. (shrink)

O presente artigo aborda a instituição de órgãos de polícia como representantes do poder e da autoridade do Estado sob a ótica da filosofia, sobretudo no contexto do contrato social, fundamentada em revisão bibliográfica. Ainda que o homem tenha preterido sua liberdade natural em prol de uma liberdade assistida, e sendo a polícia um dos órgãos responsáveis por essa assistência, não há como afirmar que esse trabalho está correspondendo aos anseios da sociedade, sobretudo ao se analisar os índices de violência (...) que a envolvem. Nesse sentido, a sociedade vem questionando a necessidade da existência dessas instituições, muitas vezes, inclusive, pedindo sua extinção. (shrink)

What obligations are there on voters? This paper argues that voters should make their electoral decision competently, and does so by developing on a recent proposal for democratic legitimacy. It then explores three problems arising from this ‘competency obligation’. First, how should voters be competent? I propose three conditions required for voter competence. Second, how competent should voters be? I argue that the competency required tracks the significance of the consequences of the vote. Third, if the electorate are unlikely to (...) deliver a competent decision, should suffrage be restricted to the competent alone? I defend unrestricted suffrage on the grounds that restricting suffrage cannot guarantee a competently made electoral decision. Instead, obligations on voters should be minimised by political parties satisfying their obligations to be politically sound; if they are sound, then the obligation to be competent can be easily satisfied by voters. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This commentary shows how Dormandy’s ‘Partiality Norm of Belief for Faith’ can be made compatible with ‘Evidentialism about Faith’. Dormandy takes partiality to involve disrespect toward evidence—where evidence we are partial toward is given undue weight. I propose an alternative where partiality is to require more or less evidence for believing a proposition given the benefits or harms of holding the belief. Rather than disrespecting evidence, this partiality is simply to have variable ‘evidence thresholds’ that are partly set by (...) pragmatic considerations. Evidence is not disrespected; an agent just requires more or less of it on pragmatic grounds. (shrink)

Freedom of speech in universities is currently an issue of widespread concern and debate. Recent empirical findings in the UK shed some light on whether speech is unduly restricted in the university, but it suffers from two limitations. First, the results appear contradictory. Some studies show that the issue of free speech is overblown by media reportage, whilst others track serious concerns about free speech arising from certain university policies. Second, the findings exclude important issues concerning restrictions to speech on (...) campus that fall outside of the traditional debate around violations to free speech rights. This is particularly the case when certain voices are excluded from important policy conversations, and in issues around diversifying the curriculum. This paper overcomes these two limitations by developing a novel conceptual framework within which to situate current debates concerning speech related matters in universities. It does so by developing a taxonomy around the concept of ‘silencing’. It then considers the current issue of speech matters in universities within this framework to determine whether, and to what extent, speech is indeed unduly restricted, and where this is a concern for free speech violations, and where it falls outside of this issue. (shrink)

The cultivation of intellectual character is an important goal within university education. This article focusses on cultivating intellectual humility. It first explores an account of intellectual humility from recent literature on the intellectual virtues. Then, it considers one recent pedagogical approach – Making Thinking Visible – as a means of teaching intellectual virtue. It assesses one particular technique for cultivating intellectual humility arising from this pedagogical literature, and applies it to the teaching of political philosophy. Finally, there is a discussion (...) concerning how to supplement these techniques to best teach political philosophy generally, and for the purposes of cultivating intellectual humility in particular. It is argued that, by introducing the technique of the Circle of Viewpoints, supplemented by techniques from the Compassion in Education literature, the modules I teach can better cultivate intellectual humility in my students. (shrink)

The world of entrepreneurship has historically been linked with taking risks and the potential for significant rewards. However, there persists a notable gender imbalance in the entrepreneurial landscape, wherein women entrepreneurs remain a minority. Women navigating the entrepreneurial path encounter distinct challenges, setting their experiences apart from their male counterparts. In Balayan, Batangas, despite strides towards gender equality, women entrepreneurs continue to face challenges in the entrepreneurial landscape. This qualitative study delves into the experiences of 10 successful female entrepreneurs who (...) met specific criteria. Accordingly, semi-structured interviews are conducted, exploring various aspects of participants' experiences and revealing their motivations, achievements, challenges, and strategies. Thematic analysis reveals the connection between familial, community-driven, and personal motivations that drive these entrepreneurs forward. Despite facing obstacles such as financial constraints and gender biases, they prioritize financial gains and personal growth. With resilience, innovation, and dedication, these women overcome challenges and achieve success, utilizing support networks and online marketing strategies to their advantage. Recommendations include empowering women in entrepreneurship, strengthening support networks, introducing tailored financial literacy programs, and advocating against gender biases. Implement skill development initiatives and provide specialized education in online marketing. Engage in policy advocacy, celebrate success stories, and continuously research challenges and successes. Foster collaborative partnerships between businesses, educational institutions, and communities, and advocate for increased funding opportunities for sustainable growth. This research emphasizes the strength and capabilities of women entrepreneurs in Balayan, Batangas, affirming that "pink doesn't mean weak.". (shrink)

Religious fictionalism is the theory that it is morally and intellectually legitimate to affirm religious sentences and to engage in public and private religious practices, without believing the content of religious claims. This article discusses the main features of fictionalism, contrasts hermeneutic, and revolutionary kinds of fictionalism and explores possible historical and recent examples of religious fictionalism. Such examples are found in recent theories of faith, pragmatic approaches to religion, and mystical traditions in religious theology.

The Bohr radius for an ionizing electron (H atom) follows a hyperbolic spiral. At specific spiral angles, the angle components cancel returning an integer value for the radius (360°=4r, 360+120°=9r, 360+180°=16r, 360+216°=25r ... 720°= ∞r), and as the orbital radius at these angles (by including wavelengths) matches the principal quantum number n energy levels, this spiral can be used to calculate the transition frequencies for each n. A gravitational orbital simulation program was modified for atomic orbitals by the addition of (...) an extra fine structure constant alpha term. In this simulation, the orbital (Bohr) radius is treated as analogous to the photon albeit of inverse or reverse phase whereby orbital radius + photon = zero (cancel). The orbital radius rotates, pulling the electron in a circular orbit, during transition the incoming photon attaches to the orbital radius, extending it in discrete steps (the electron itself has a passive role). As the orbital radius continues its rotation during the transition phase, the electron follows this spiral pattern (as it crosses each energy level). As these spiral angles (0 < φ < 720°) can be used to derive the n quantum levels, we can ask if quantization of the atom is a geometrical function of this alpha spiral, and if so, this would indicate a role of alpha within the atom. (shrink)

We propose an account of the subject’s cognition that allows for a full articulation of the phenomenon of ideology. We argue that ideology operates at the level of the a priori: it transcendentally conditions the intelligibility of thought and practice. But we draw from strands of post-Kantian philosophy of science and social philosophy in repudiating Kant’s view that the a priori is necessary and fixed. Instead, we argue, it is contingent, and therefore revisable. More precisely, it is conditioned materially: it (...) must be understood as an activity, continuous with and shaped by material social practice. We conclude with some remarks about the possibility of agency over one’s relativized, materially conditioned a priori; that is, over the possibility of critique. (shrink)

The article introduces a special issue on “Rethinking Liberal Multiculturalism: Foundations, Practices and Methodologies.” The contributions presented in this special issue were discussed during the conference « Multicultural Citizenship 25 Years Later », held in Paris in November 2021. Their aim is to take stock of the legacy of Kymlicka’s contribution and to highlight new developments in theories of liberal multiculturalism and minority rights. The contributions do not purport to challenge the legitimacy of theories of multiculturalism and minority rights, they (...) rather aim at deepening our understanding of the foundations of liberal multiculturalism and of its practical implementation, sensitive to social scientific dynamics of diverse societies. Without abandoning the general idea that cultural minorities should be granted special minority rights, the essays presented raise new questions about three dimensions central to liberal multiculturalism: its normative foundations, its practical categories of minorities or groups, and its fact-sensitive methodology. Taken together they shed light on the renewed variety of theories of liberal multiculturalism highlighting their complexity and internal disagreements. To introduce these articles, the article first draws a brief historical overview of the debates on multiculturalism since the 1990s (section 1). It then highlights the distinctive aspects of Kymlicka’s contribution (section 2) and identifies recent research trends (section 3). Doing so, it explains how the articles gathered here both expand on those distinctive aspects and explore those new research avenues. The section 4 summarizes the contributions. (shrink)

A militância política de Jorge Amado no Partido Comunista é um capítulo à parte na história do comunismo no Brasil, que completou 100 anos no dia 25 de março. Ela também é algo marcante em sua obra, a ponto da crítica literária brasileira, de tradição uspiana, considerá-la uma forma de panfleto partidário da nossa esquerda. Nesta exposição, pretende-se realizar uma breve discussão acerca de suas lutas políticas, das quais se destacam as questões religiosa e racial, que levaram Jorge Amado a (...) criar um projeto de lei, no período que exerceu o mandato de deputado constituinte pelo PCB, em 1946, assegurando a liberdade religiosa no Brasil. Aqui, também se destaca a sua amizade com o povo de candomblé que lhe honrou com títulos, como o de Obá de Xangô e Ogã de Iansã; além da forma como a crítica o rotulava de regionalista e escritor panfletário. Contudo, esta é uma forma de homenagear tanto o mais famoso dos doze Obás de Xangô da Bahia, quanto o Partidão, nesse seu centenário. Em termos metodológicos, trata-se de uma leitura ensaística foucaultiana sobre esses fatos e acontecimentos que marcaram duplamente a vida de Jorge Amado e do Comunismo no Brasil, já que lançamos mão de uma parte da maquinaria teórica do militante comunista do PCF (Partido Comunista Francês), Michel Foucault, como vontade de verdade, comentário, discurso, autoria, obra, descontinuidade (na continuidade) e dispersão. (shrink)

Este artigo empreende uma discussão acerca da noção de fórmula discursiva nos trabalhos de Krieg-Planque e de um possível diálogo com o trabalho desenvolvido por Foucault, sobretudo, a partir do modo como o filósofo percebe o discurso, uma vez que ambos pertencem a uma tradição epistemológica francesa. Dessa forma, vamos adentrar pelo percurso de lapidação da noção de fórmula, tomando, para isso, a entrevista que Krieg-Planque concedeu a Philippe Schepens do Laboratoire de Sémio-linguistique, didatique e informatique (LASELDI) e do livro (...) A noção de fórmula em análise do discurso: quadro teórico e metodológico, trabalhos que representam para nós brasileiros uma espécie de introdução à discussão sobre a noção de fórmula proposta por Krieg-Planque no campo da Escola Francesa de Análise do Discurso (AD). Nessa discussão, vamos perceber que toda fórmula discursiva traz consigo uma densidade histórica apoiada em pré-construídos que estão voltados para as novas construções, tal qual propunha Foucault acerca das práticas e das materialidades discursivas em sua arqueologia do saber e em sua genealogia do poder. (shrink)

The claim that ―concepts serve as rules for the synthesis of representations‖ is understood by the mainstream of Kant‘s scholarship as if categories and concepts, in general, are conditions for the constitution of objects out of the manifold of sensations devoid of reference. That is the claim that I wish to question here. The claim comes in different flavors and formulations. Still, none of them are relevant here. I aim to provide an alternative account for the claim that ―the representation (...) makes the object possible.‖ I argue that the traditional view represents a solution to what I call the pseudo-problem of intentionality, namely to account for how a representation of something emerges out of a manifold of sensations devoid of reference. Yet, the intentionality problem is a misunderstanding of what I call the recognition thesis: the role of concepts is to provide the rules for the (mind-dependent) recognition (Erkenntnis) of the mind-independent existence of transcendental objects (noumena). ―The representation makes the object possible in the relevant sense that only by means of concepts can we recognize that what is sense-dependently represented actually exists mind-independently as transcendental objects or noumena in the negative sense. My view is embedded in the framework of what today is called ―Kantian Nonceptualism‖. Still, my view is neither a simple re-statement of Kantian Nonconceptualism nor depends on it. It is independently grounded on what Kant calls ―Erkenntnis‖. (shrink)

My account of the causal role of consciousness in a physical world is modeled on Dretske’s celebrated explanation of the causal role of beliefs (something that Dretske himself never offered). First, behavior must be understood as a (broadly individuated) process that begins with some external stimulus causing some neurological event C, and ends with causing a bodily movement M (e.g., the Kennedy assassination is a process that begins with Oswald pulling the trigger at 12:30pm CST on November 23 in 1963 (...) in Dallas, Texas, but only ends half an hour later when Kennedy is pronounced dead at 1 pm CST). The internal neurological event C causes bodily movement M, but only by virtue of being recruited by natural selection to represent the instantiation of some external property F when properly stimulated under normal circumstances. But the reason why C causes M lies in the fact that C represents the instantiation of the external property F. I withdraw my hand from a hot surface because the activation of nociceptive specific neurons in my parietal lobe (together with the activation of neuronal patterns in my motor cortices) was recruited by natural selection to represent the tissue damage in my hand. The activation of nociceptive specific neurons causes my hand to withdraw but for the reason that it represents tissue data at the time that I felt pain in my hand. (shrink)

This paper aims to present a novel reading of Kantian idealism. In want of a better name, I call my interpretation “one-object-plus-epistemic phenomenalism.” I partially endorse Allison’s celebrated position, namely his rejection of metaphysical world-dualism. Yet, I reject Allison’s deflationary two-aspect view. I argue that Kantian idealism is also metaphysically committed to an ontological noumenalism (one-object), namely the claim that the ultimate nature of reality is made up of unknown things in themselves (substantia noumena). Natural sciences can only reveal the (...) relational/structural properties of things as they appear rather than the intrinsic properties of substantia noumena in the negative sense. My anti-deflationary reading is similar to Allais’s, and my agnostic monism to Hanna’s. However, against both, I hold that appearances are not the accusative objects of our sensible representations but rather, as Kant repeatedly states: “mere representations.” The accusative objects of our senses are substantia noumena in the negative sense. Moreover, my view is also similar to Langton’s. Again, against Langton, I hold that appearances are not merely relational properties of substantia noumena but the way that such substantia noumena exist inside our mind as “mere representations.” In this regard, I also partially endorse Guyer’s and Van Cleve’s phenomenalist reading because these substantia noumena in the negative sense can only be cognized mind-dependently, namely as appearances. However, against Guyer and Van Cleve, I hold that the phenomenalist side of Kantian idealism is purely epistemological rather than ontological: what Kant calls the necessary unity of representations according to categories is not a logical construction of objects out of representations, that is, an ontological reduction of noumena to appearances, but rather the way we sense-independently cognize mind-independent noumena. (shrink)

During the past two decades or so, the emergence and ever-accelerating development of digital media have sparked scholarly interest, debates, and complex challenges across many disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities. Within this diverse scholarship, the research on digitality, gender, sexuality, and embodiment has contributed substantially to many academic fields, such as media studies, sociology, religion, philosophy, and education studies. As a part of the special issue “Gender, Sexuality, and Embodiment in Digital Spheres: Connecting Intersectionality and Digitality,” this (...) roundtable consists of a conversation between five researchers from different (inter)disciplinary locations, all addressing matters of methodology, intersectionality, positionality, and theory in relation to the topics of gender, sexuality, and embodiment in digital spheres. Said roundtable begins with a critical self-positioning of the participants’ (inter)disciplinary and embodied locations using examples from their own research. The conversation then progresses to how these researchers have employed contemporary theories, conceptual vocabularies, methods, and analyses of gender, sexuality, and embodiment in digital spheres to then conclude with some ethico-political notes about collaborations between scholars and (digital) activists. (shrink)

Outlined here is a simulation hypothesis approach that uses an expanding (the simulation clock-rate measured in units of Planck time) 4-axis hyper-sphere and mathematical particles that oscillate between an electric wave-state and a mass (unit of Planck mass per unit of Planck time) point-state. Particles are assigned a spin axis which determines the direction in which they are pulled by this (hyper-sphere pilot wave) expansion, thus all particles travel at, and only at, the velocity of expansion (the origin of $c$), (...) however only the particle point-state has definable co-ordinates within the hyper-sphere. Photons are the mechanism of information exchange, as they lack a mass state they can only travel laterally (in hypersphere co-ordinate terms) between particles and so this hypersphere expansion cannot be directly observed, relativity then becomes the mathematics of perspective translating between the absolute (hypersphere) and the relative motion (3D space) co-ordinate systems. A discrete `pixel' lattice geometry is assigned as the gravitational space. Units of $\hbar c$ `physically' link particles into orbital pairs. As these are direct particle to particle links, a gravitational force between macro objects is not required, the gravitational orbit as the sum of these individual orbiting pairs. A 14.6 billion year old hyper-sphere (the sum of Planck black-hole units) has similar parameters to the cosmic microwave background. The Casimir force is a measure of the background radiation density. (shrink)

Nossa pesquisa vai refletir sobre o discurso da política educacional brasileira implementada a partir da Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional, particularmente, aquele que trata da formação docente. Ele tem imposto uma reconfiguração da identidade dos professores, concedendo-lhes uma autonomia de autoconhecimento e resolução dos problemas cotidianos, que, no nosso entendimento, não corresponde ao que acontece na escola (VILLA, 1998; LAWN, 2001; VEIGA, 2002; VASCONCELLOS, 2003). Assim, pretendemos apresentar e discutir sobre as representações da identidade do professor nos (...) PCN (Português). Esperamos, com isso, contribuir para a construção de uma política de formação de professores sensível às diferenças culturais e identitárias dos professores no Brasil. (shrink)

Objective of the study: To analyze the costs and profits of sugarcane production regarding the cultural practices of sugarcane suppliers. Methodology/approach: This study positions itself in this gap by comparatively analyzing 6 types of cultural practices: unraveling, windrowing, application of correctives, herbicides, insecticides and fertilizers, with the option of two systems Fixed rate (TF) and Variable rate (TV). Originality/Relevance: Brazil is a world reference in sugarcane production, with the State of São Paulo being the largest Brazilian producer. However, for sugarcane (...) suppliers to maintain this activity there is a need to reduce production costs and increase profitability/ha. However, there is a theoretical-practical gap in the financial assessment (costs and profits) of different cultural practices inherent to sugarcane production. Main results: The results demonstrated that the costs of cultural practices represent more than 30% of the total sugarcane production costs. The TF system proved to be more cost-efficient in the following operations: correctives, herbicides and insecticides. In the application of fertilizers, the TV system, in broadcast mode, had the best result. Finally, the profit/ton was R$1.70, demonstrating a very low profit margin/ha given the risk of the activity. Theoretical/methodological contributions: The sample for this research comprised 55 sugarcane suppliers from the State of São Paulo, whose data were obtained through a survey. The comparative analysis was based on the difference in costs of cultural practices and the estimation of the level of certainty (profit/costs), analyzed through the cumulative frequency carried out through the Monte Carlo Simulation (SMC). (shrink)

A partir de dados brasileiros e espanhóis, este artigo aborda aspectos relevantes da doação e transplantes de órgãos, como a relação entre oferta e demanda, legislação vigente, custos e possíveis estratégias para aumentar taxas de doação e melhorar de forma geral o processo de transplantes. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar dados empíricos atuais que incrementem o conhecimento relevante para a avaliação bioética. Os dois países se destacam: o Brasil por ter o maior sistema público de transplantes de órgãos do (...) mundo, e a Espanha por manter há décadas o maior índice de doadores efetivos por milhão de pessoas. Análise inicial dos dados sugere a necessidade de lidar mais abertamente com os interesses dos afetados e a opinião pública, criando articulação sistêmica entre legislação, políticas públicas baseadas em evidências e pesquisa. (shrink)